Fuentes v. Tucker (1947)

OPINION BY GIBSON, CHIEF JUSTICE OF CALIFORNIA

The minor sons of the respective plaintiffs were killed by an automobile operated by defendant. The two actions were consolidated for trial, and in each case the verdict of the jury awarded the plaintiffs $7,500. Defendant appealed from the judgments claiming the trial court erred in permitting plaintiffs to present evidence of facts outside the issues framed by the pleadings.

On the day of the trial defendant filed an amended answer in each case which admitted "that he was and is liable for the death of the deceased...and the damages directly and proximately caused thereby." Plaintiffs were nevertheless permitted to prove the circumstances of the accident, including the facts that defendant was intoxicated and that the children were thrown eighty feet by the force of the impact.

It is defendant's position that the introduction of evidence as to the circumstances of the accident was error because it was not relevant or material to the amount of the damages, which was the only issue to be determined by the jury. Plaintiffs contend that defendant could not, by acknowledging legal responsibility for the deaths of the children, deprive them of the right to show the circumstances surrounding the accident, and that therefore it was not error to admit evidence of such facts. They do not claim, however, that the evidence was material to any of the facts in dispute under the pleadings as they stood at the commencement of the trial.

It is a doctrine too long established to be open to dispute that the proof must be confined to the issues in the case and that the time of the court should not be wasted, and the jury should not be confused, by the introduction of evidence which is not relevant or material to the matters to be adjudicated. This is merely one aspect of the larger problem of delay in the conduct of litigation. Every court has a responsibility to the public to see that justice is administered efficiently and expeditiously and that the facilities of the court are made available at the first possible moment to those whose cases are awaiting trial. It would be unwarranted waste of public funds, and a manifest injustice to the many litigants seeking an early trial date, to allow counsel in a particular case to occupy substantial periods of time in the useless presentation of evidence on matters not in controversy; and we know of no well considered opinion which asserts such a right.

One of the functions of pleadings is to limit the issues and narrow the proofs. If facts alleged in the complaint are not controverted by the answer, they are not in issue, and no evidence need be offered to prove their existence. Evidence which is not pertinent to the issues raised by the pleadings is immaterial, and it is error to allow the introduction of such evidence.

It follows, therefore, if an issue has been removed from a case by an admission in the answer, that it is error to receive evidence which is material solely to the excluded matter. This, of course, does not mean that an admission of liability precludes a plaintiff from showing how an accident happened if such evidence is material to the issue of damages. In an action for personal injuries, where liability is admitted and the only issue to be tried is the amount of damage, the force of the impact and the surrounding circumstances may be relevant and material to indicate the extent of plaintiff's injuries. Such evidence is admissible because it is relevant and material to an issue remaining in the case.

The defendant here by an unqualified statement in his answer admitted liability for the deaths of the children, and the sole remaining question in issue was the amount of damages suffered by the parents. In an action for wrongful death of a minor child the damages consist of the pecuniary loss to the parents in being deprived of the services, earnings, society, comfort and protection of the child. The manner in which the accident occurred, the force of the impact, or defendant's intoxication could have no bearing on these elements of damage. The evidence, therefore, was not material to any issue before the jury, and its admission was error...

The introduction of evidence of admitted facts is permissible in cases where the admission is ambiguous in form or limited in scope or where, during the trial of a case, a party seeks to deprive his opponents of the legitimate force and effect of material evidence by the bald admission of a probative fact.

The boys involved in this accident were approximately twelve years old when they were killed. Certainly the sum of $7,500, which was awarded by the jury in each case, cannot be said to be an unreasonable amount to allow for the wrongful death of a child of that age, and the verdicts are not so large as to indicate that the jury was unduly influenced by the admission of the immaterial testimony in question. It does not appear, therefore, that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The judgments are affirmed